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Abstract 
In this thesis, I attempt to answer the research question ‘What can explain the change in compliant 
behaviour of the People’s Republic of China’s with the UNCLOS during the conflict with the 
Republic of the Philippines between 1996 and 2016?’ The thesis will use a case study and process 
tracing. There are three explanatory factors, derived from previous literature and my theoretical 
framework, that have potentially influenced China’s changing compliance behaviour in the South 
China Sea dispute. These elements are: the core principles and interest of China’s policy, China’s rise, 
and the influence of external threats on China’s behaviour. My analysis shows that all three factors 
exercise a certain influence on China’s changing behaviour. However, the strongest explanatory factor 
is China’s changing perception on external threats. The outcome of this study contributes to a better 
understanding of China’s behaviour, and it provides a contribution to future research on this subject. 
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1. Introduction 
On January 22, 2013, the government of the Republic of the Philippines surprised China and the rest 
of the world by announcing that it would unilaterally submit its overlapping territorial claims with 
China in the South China Sea to the international legal arbitration of the United Nations (UN). This 
action resulted from the longstanding conflict between the two states, which began because of the 
increased economic importance of the offshore islands in the South China Sea. Interest in exploring 
the South China Sea for maritime resources has increased since the 1970s; China established a 
presence in the Spratly Islands in 1987 (Fravel 2008: 274). The increasing importance of these 
offshore islands is also illustrated by negotiation of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which laid the foundations for the international maritime regime (Hossain 
2013).  
Over the years, tensions between the South China Sea claimants were heightened. Negotiations on the 
Spratly Islands began in 1994 between China and the other claimants, the Philippines and Vietnam. 
However, China failed to establish a peaceful presence in the South China Sea, and in 1995 reports of 
Chinese maritime actions in disputed zones of the South China Sea brought international attention to 
China’s potential for aggression (Lee 1999). The first turning point	 for China’s compliant behaviour 
was in 1996, when China ratified the UNCLOS to express its peaceful intentions in the South China 
Sea. In 1997, China and the Philippines agreed to bilateral agreements in effort to diffuse the tension. 
In the following years tensions were further increased, which triggered international involvement and 
the interference of, among others, the United States. This enduring conflict resulted in the initiation of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2013, which was set up under the UNCLOS.  
The initiation of the PCA was a major development in the longstanding dispute between China and 
the Philippines, as it was the first time a Southeast Asian state had resorted to legal means to 
challenge the so-called expansionist behaviour of China (Kim 2016). In response, China rejected the 
legal arbitration of the UN and adhered to a position of non-participation and non-acceptance (Yu 
2016). This noncompliant behaviour towards the PCA is noteworthy because the Philippine initiation 
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was based on a compulsorily arbitration system of the UNCLOS under which China and the 
Philippines, both signatories, should accept the arbitration (Yu 2016: 216). China’s decision to ignore 
the legal arbitration has left the nation open to criticism that it did not commit to the international 
legal norms of the UNCLOS and the rules-based system of global governance (Storey 2013). It has 
heightened the political and security tensions in the South China Sea and increased international 
involvement in the South China Sea issue (Yu 2016). Before the PCA became involved in this 
conflict, China showed compliant behaviour with the UNCLOS and claimed it had no hegemonic 
intentions or aspirations to territorial expansion (SC PRC 2005). However, the publication of a 
position paper against the PCA Arbitration in 2016 that marked China’s noncompliant behaviour has 
made international society think otherwise (Kim 2016: 27). China’s change in behaviour since the 
ratification of the UNCLOS in 1996 is remarkable and leads to the following research question:  
What can explain the change in compliant behaviour of People’s Republic of China with the UNCLOS 
during the conflict with the Republic of the Philippines between 1996 and 2016? 
The factors used to explain this research question are derived from previous studies. These are: the 
implications of China’s rise, its core principles and interests, and China’s perception on external 
threats and pressures during conflict. As previous studies have shown which are discussed in the 
literature review, there is still no concluding answer to describe the change of China’s behaviour 
(Hossain 2014; Odeyemi 2015; Feng 2016). Scholars have formerly shown that both China’s rise and 
the core principles and interests of China’s policy are important factors in explaining the nation’s 
behaviour, (Mearsheimer 2006; Shih & Yin 2013). However, these factors cannot account for the 
change in China’s compliance behaviour in this dispute, without recognizing the influence of external 
threats (Fravel 2008; Feng 2016). Therefore, this study combines explanations of the causal factors in 
a neoclassical realist framework to attempt to answer the research question. The causal factors are 
analysed in a case study with the help of process tracing, which attempts to trace the links between 
intervening processes and the observed outcomes (George & Bennett 2005). The analysis is based on 
official documents and statements of the Chinese government. This study concludes with the most 
important findings of the analyses, which show that China’s behaviour is influenced by China’s 
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economic rise, its core principles and interests, and also by China’s interpretation of external threats. 
The influence of the final causal factor should be taken into consideration in future policies that have 
an impact on China, and it provides a line of approach for further studies on this subject.   
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2. Literature Review 
This literature review provides an overview of prior research on the compliance behaviour of states 
during conflicts. It compares and contrasts different theoretical frameworks and qualitative methods to 
study the compliance behaviour of states. During this process, the explanatory gaps in prior research 
are highlighted. This will define the theoretical framework and causal factors that will be used to 
explain the change in compliance behaviour China with the UNCLOS during the conflict with the 
Philippines between 1996 and 2016. By doing so, it shows how this study is related to previous 
studies and how it will contribute to the study of China’s behaviour in the South China Sea dispute.  
The causal factors that are used to explain states’ behaviour can be categorized on their level of 
analysis. Factors of both the systemic and the domestic level of analysis are used in different 
explanations of the change in states’ compliance behaviour (Rosyidin 2017; Krishner 2010). One of 
the debates regarding the levels of analysis regards the relative capability of different categories of 
explanatory factors and how these relate to the levels of analysis (Ray 2001: 355). This debate 
originates from Singer’s 1961 article ‘The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,’ in 
which he concludes that the relationship between propositions about foreign policy, on the one side, 
and international politics, on the other side, ‘represents different levels of analysis’ (Singer 1961: 29). 
This relationship can also be found in the behaviour of China towards international society, because 
the change in compliance behaviour is displayed in its foreign policy, which is influenced, by 
international pressures and events (Storey 2013). Therefore, this literature review includes research on 
both the domestic and systemic level of analysis. 
The main theory that operates on the systemic level of analysis to explain state behaviour and 
compliance during conflict is realism (Krishner 2010). According to the offensive realist view 
(Mearsheimer 2006), the international system has three defining characteristics that influence states’ 
behaviour: an anarchic international system, states that seek to maximize their power, and the 
impossibility of states knowing each other’s intentions (Mearsheimer 2014). These systemic 
characteristics influence the behaviour of states in a way that inhibits cooperation and compliance 
with institutions, due to two factors: relative gains and the possibility of cheating (Mearsheimer 1994-
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95: 12). However, if this theoretical approach is applied to the situation between China and the 
Philippines in the South China Sea, it fails to explain why China would comply with the UNCLOS in 
the first place if China intends to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for its neighbours 
itself.  
The neorealist approach also attempts to explain state behaviour and the influence of systemic 
pressures. Although this theory provides a significant contribution to the explanatory variables on the 
systemic level of analysis, it neglects domestic influences in state behaviour, as neorealists state that 
‘the behaviour of states and statesmen is indeterminate’ (Waltz 1979; 69). By ignoring the domestic 
level, neorealism fails to explain China’s change in compliance behaviour. It considers China’s core 
principles and interests on peaceful coexistence and the pursuance of international joint development 
to be irrelevant, because these influential factors are derived from the domestic level of analysis (Shih 
& Yin 2013; Huang 2014). A purely systemic explanation is therefore not sufficient to account for 
China’s change in compliance behaviour during the conflict in the South China Sea. 
Research on the influence of China’s core interests and principles on its policy study casual factors at 
the domestic level of analysis (Shih & Yin 2013; Rosyidin 2017; Kim 2016). These studies apply 
different theoretical frameworks such as strategic culturalism (Rosyidin 2017), or combine elements 
of grand theories (Kim 2016: 29). The origins of China’s ‘core principles’ and ‘interests’ can be 
traced back to the Ming Dynasty (Johnston 1996). Deng Xiaoping, one of China’s leading figures, had 
set China’s core principles in the 1970s, specifically focused on foreign policy. Though Deng 
Xiaoping was never one of China’s formal leaders, he is considered to be an important leader and 
‘comrade’ of the Chinese government, as he is still referred to in recent statements (Cui & Pang 2012: 
4). With his principles, Deng Xiaoping advocated for the creation and maintenance of a peaceful 
international external environment for national development (Huang 2014: 139).  On the one hand, he 
ascertains sovereignty as the core interest of China, but on the other hand he also emphasizes the 
importance of setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development. These interests influence 
China’s foreign policy and its behaviour in international society (Shih & Yin 2013). However, this 
approach cannot explain China’s explicit rejection of the arbitrational court of the UNCLOS. This 
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rejection of the court is an explicit form of noncompliant behaviour and is not in line with the 
supposed core principle of maintaining a peaceful international environment or joint development. 
Therefore, the domestic explanation in itself is not sufficient to explain China’s behaviour, and 
systemic influences should be taken into consideration to explain China’s rejection of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (Fravel 2008; Feng 2016). 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Neither a purely systemic approach, such as that of the neorealists, nor a purely domestic approach, 
such as that of strategic culturalism, can account for the changing behaviour of China in the South 
China Sea conflict (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, 2009: 2). The conflict must be studied with a 
combination of potential explanations that are derived from both the systemic and domestic level. 
Whereas neorealism only considers causal factors of the systemic level of analysis as influential, the 
neoclassical realist approach also takes causal factors of the domestic level of analysis into 
consideration. It provides a theoretical framework that draws insights from both neorealism and 
classical realism. The theory attempts to explain specific behaviour from states rather than the general 
outcome in international relations (Feng 2016). This approach views states as key actors, as during 
territorial conflicts, such as the South China Sea dispute, the core interests of the state—its national 
sovereignty and international integrity—are at stake (Fravel 2011). To maintain their integrity and 
sovereignty a state has to face both internal as external challenges. Thus, the potential explanations for 
state behaviour are restricted to neither the systemic nor the domestic level of analysis. “The domestic 
interests in addition to the international interests permit a more nuanced understanding of state 
behaviour and where it comes from” (Fravel 2008: 280). 
The neoclassical realist approach has already been used to explain the changes in China’s behaviour 
during maritime territorial conflicts (Fravel 2008; 2011; Rathbun 2008). The research conducted by 
Fravel (2008; 2011) describes three types of strategies a state can apply in conflicts: cooperation, 
escalation, or delay. The selection for these strategies is triggered by the presence (or absence) of 
internal and external threats.  
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There are two types of external threats that trigger states to switch strategy and change their 
behaviour. Firstly, an external threat to a state’s relative power position from a stronger state might 
trigger cooperation (Fravel 2008: 17). In light of the current dispute, this would mean that the 
involvement of, for example, the United States1 in the South China Sea dispute would trigger China to 
show compliance behaviour with the international arbitration. Secondly, competition with a specific 
state may trigger the incentive to cooperate in disputes with third parties (Fravel 2008: 18). This 
theory does provide some useful insights in the factors that might suddenly change states’ behaviour. 
Therefore, the main causal factor that is analysed in this study is the external threats that influence 
China’s behaviour.  
However, according to this theory, external threats to security should lead to compromise, whilst 
China explicitly rejects the arbitration of the UNCLOS. At first glance, these external threats and 
pressures, including the United States’ military involvement2, do not trigger compromising behaviour. 
This discrepancy between the observed behaviour of China and Fravel’s theoretical explanation of the 
influence of external threats illustrates the explanatory gap on which this study is focused.  
To clarify China’s change in behaviour and fill the explanatory gap in earlier research, this study will 
use the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism and uses causal factors from both systemic and 
domestic levels of analysis. One of these causal factors used by neoclassical realists (Feng 2016) is 
the economic rise of China. This development cannot be left unnoticed, as it is subject to many policy 
debates and theoretical discussions on China’s foreign policy (Mearsheimer 2006; Buzan 2010). 
China’s economic growth has certain influences on the observed changes in its behaviour (Feng 2016; 
Mearsheimer 2014; Hossain 2013). Therefore, this study includes the general implications of China’s 
economic rise to provide an all-encompassing overview. In addition to the influence of China’s rise, 
this study will also consider the influence of the core interests and principles of China that are 
included in aforementioned research (Feng 2016; Rosyidin 2017). Both these factors support the 
influence of the main causal factor: international events and threats that impact China’s behaviour. 
																																								 																				
1 The US is referred to as one of ‘the strongest states in the system’ by Fravel (2008: 18). 
2 This refers to the enhanced military cooperation between the Philippines and the United States, in accordance 
with their mutual agreement (Kim 2016). 
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The influence of external threats on China’s compliance behaviour is considered to be of great 
importance, because this causal factor can suddenly trigger states to change their behaviour, whilst the 
other two factors gradually influence states’ behaviour (Fravel 2008: 21). The impact of all three 
causal factors are analysed in the case study and the implications of these results are discussed in the 
conclusion. 
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3. Research Design 
The goal of this study is analysing China’s changing behaviour and determining what processes 
during the measurement period have explanatory value. A small-N case study offers the possibility of 
establishing a more detailed explanation of ‘how their cases relate to the others in a broader universe’ 
(Seawright & Gerring 2008: 295). This case study covers two decades, between 1996 and 2016. This 
period is consciously chosen around two turning points in China’s position in the international society 
and its relationship with the Philippines. In 1996, China ratified the UNCLOS. This convention has 
been in place since 1982 and was already ratified by the most states in the Asia Pacific community 
(Lee 1999: 38). China pursued cooperation in the South China Sea by making it known that it would 
follow the UNCLOS, as will become apparent from the subsequent analyses. The rejection of the 
decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 marks another turning point in China’s 
behaviour, because it explicitly shows non-compliance behaviour with international law and the 
UNCLOS, and influences China’s position in international society (Yu 2016).  
3.1 Case Selection 
China’s disregarding the arbitration by the PCA is a unique event. Therefore, the case study will be 
conducted with the deviant case method. This method selects a case which, by reference to the normal 
understanding of the particular topic, shows a surprising outcome (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 302). 
As mentioned above, the analysed conflict is unique due to the fact that it is the first South China Sea 
conflict to be submitted to an international legal institution, specifically to the Arbitrational Court set 
up under Annex VII of the UNCLOS. China’s (2014) explicit non-acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
tribunal3 can be seen as anomalous and therefore as deviant. (McLaughlin Mitchell & Hensell 2007). 
The deviant character of this case can be determined by the analysis of previous conflicts that were 
submitted to the arbitration of the Annex VII tribunal of the UNCLOS. Although several procedures 
are applicable in this legal arbitration tribunal and it gives various rulings, it has never been rejected 
by a respondent state, as shown by Table 1 (Yu 2016: 216).  
																																								 																				
3 In its statement on ‘Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration 
Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines 2016’ it also rejected the verdict of the PCA 
(FMPRC, 12 July 2016). 
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Table 1: Annex VII Arbitrations of UNCLOS 
Annex VII Arbitrations 
Year Case Procedure Outcome  
1997 St. Vincent & the Grenadines v. 
Guinea 
Transferred to other Court - 
1999 Australia & New Zealand v. Japan Bifurcation Final decision 
2000 Chile v. European Union Transferred to other Court - 
2001 Ireland v. United Kingdom - Termination Ireland 
2003 Malaysia v. Singapore - Termination by 
jointed requested 
2004 Barbados vs. Trinidad & Tobago Joinder Final decision 
2004 Guyana v. Suriname Joinder Final decision 
2009 Bangladesh v. India Joinder Final decision 
2009 Bangladesh v. Myanmar Delimitation maritime border - 
2010 Mauritius v. United Kingdom Joinder Final decision 
2011 Panama v. Guinea-Bissau - Default 
2012 Argentina v. Ghana Bifurcation - 
2013 Denmark v. European Union Pending  
2013 The Netherlands v. Russia Bifurcation Final decision 
*Compiled on the article of Yu (2016), checked at the Permanent Court of Arbitration Site. 
The purpose of the deviant case analysis is to determine the intervening processes that caused the 
changes in the noncompliant behaviour during this conflict. If the analysis successfully illustrates 
causal factors, this study might have explanatory value in other cases of noncompliant states in 
conflict. 
One of the key methods of within-case qualitative analysis is process tracing. The method of process 
tracing attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes (George & Bennett 
2005: 6). Even if the outcome of the case is already known, there are detailed processes and sequences 
that have influenced this outcome which can be identified through process tracing (Bennett 2011: 
2135). This method is endorsed by several scholars (Wendt 1999; Hall 2000) as ‘a methodology well-
suited to testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, where it is difficult to 
explain outcomes in terms of two or three intervening variables’ (George & Bennett 2005: 206). As 
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any method of analysis has its own particular issues, and one of process tracing’s issues is the 
question of whether it can lead to generalizable knowledge (Beck 2011). Although the specific 
explanation of an individual case may not be generalizable to a broader range of cases, the identified 
causal processes can be proved, through a combination of inductive and deductive methods, to be 
generalizable (Bennett & Checkel 2014: 7).  
Good process tracing features four characteristics. First, it reflects a balance of inductive and 
deductive reasoning (Waldner 2015: 127), as the tested factors are derived from longstanding 
theoretical debates. The method of process tracing tests a number of factors rather than testing 
variables that test one major hypothesis. These causal factors have ‘varying degrees of certitude and 
uniqueness and therefore can be used to affirm or disconfirm explanations’ (Van Evera 1997: 31-32). 
Second, it provides a continuous explanation that can be applied to all-important turning points in the 
case (Bennett 2011). Third, the probative value of evidence must be weighed against other alternative 
explanations and the plausible biases of this evidence must be taken into consideration. Finally, the 
evidence used cannot be known prior to the research to protect the researcher from confirmation bias 
(Bennett 2011: 2138). 
3.2 Method of Analysis  
 The within-case method of analysing processes may provide significant theoretical insights that 
explain the change in China’s behaviour. This study observes the intervening processes that led to the 
noncompliant behaviour of China during the conflict with the Philippines. The analysis consists of 
various documents that are published by the Chinese government. The motivation for the use of these 
documents is two-fold: On the one hand, it ensures the absence of Western biases in the interpretation 
of China’s foreign policy. On the other hand, the majority of the research that has been done is based 
on external views on China’s behaviour during conflict. The analyses of these documents provide 
therefore a unique view at China’s behaviour during the conflict with the Philippines in the South 
China Sea.  
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Conducting this study with this method may present implications that should be taken into 
consideration. First, the documents that are published by the Chinese government can be biased as 
well, and this must be considered during the analyses. Secondly, China’s intentions are showed more 
indirectly in their documents and statements than that we are used to in the Western policy-making 
and political statements (Cheng 1976; Rozman 2013: 157). This can present difficulties in 
determining the changes in China’s narrative. Being aware of this fact, this study attempts to find 
changes in detailed phrases of documents as well as in their overall tendencies. In addition, this study 
includes objective facts in the analysis that have the potential to show changes in the causal factors.  
For each factor, the relevant documents are derived from published documents of the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC) and the Central’s People Government of the Peoples Republic 
of China (CPG PRC). If these documents cannot cover the entire period of measurement, secondary 
sources that include official statements, such as China and the South China Sea Dialogues (Lee 
1999), are used for further analysis. Some of these official documents are periodical in nature, which 
enables a temporal comparison. The white papers on national defence are especially valuable, as these 
are the only regularly published, publicly available, official documents focussing on China’s interests 
in defence-related matters (Zhang 2012: 883). Other documents are selected from their relevance 
regarding the measured factors. The most important findings of these analyses are illustrated in the 
next section.   
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4. Analyses 
4.1 Causal factor 1 
China’s Rise: The importance of the contested areas in China’s economic rise 
China’s rise has become a self-contained subject within international relations (Buzan 2010). The 
implications of its rise on both domestic and international level have been analysed from different 
viewing points (Mearsheimer 2006; Odeyemi 2015). Whereas classical realists worry about China’s 
assertive behaviour, China has stressed its peaceful intentions multiple times. In one of its national 
defence white papers (SC PRC 2010: II), the Chinese government states that it ‘will never seek 
hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its 
economy develops.’ However, according to the neoclassical realist view it is impossible to deny that 
the rise of China has influenced the nation’s behaviour and policy (Feng 2016: 154).  
Because of the all-encompassing character of this causal factor, this analysis is narrowed to particular 
implications of China’s economic rise. It focuses on the importance of the contested areas to China’s 
rise. The influence of China’s rise on the importance of the contested areas4 shows the connection 
between the conflict and the change in China’s compliance behaviour towards the initiated arbitration 
by the Philippines.  
China’s rise can be observed in the changes in different policy areas. There are many clear 
differences, such as China’s GDP growth in comparison to the GDP growth of the United States or 
the European Union. Moreover, the increased military spending of the Chinese government is often 
used as supporting evidence for China’s assertive behaviour and hegemonic intentions (Mearsheimer 
2014).   
																																								 																				
4 The overlapping territorial claim of the Philippines and China concern the Spratly Islands. The Philippines 
submit these overlapping claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013 (PCA 2016). 
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The following indicators for China’s rise which are relevant to this study provide an interpretation of 
the excessive growth the Chinese government has had to cope with. In the last twenty years, the 
Chinese population has increased vastly (Figure 4). In conjunction, the need of natural resources has 
increased, as shown in Figure 3. This might have influence on the value of the contested maritime 
rights to the Spratly Islands. Nevertheless, these implications remain assumptions and would gain 
more value if they were confirmed by the Chinese government itself.  
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
The value of the contested areas seems obvious due to the fact that the entire conflict is based on the 
maritime rights of these Spratly Islands (Lee 1999; Fravel 2008; Kim 2016). It is a challenge to find 
official documents in which the Chinese government acknowledges this value. Although there were 
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not found any official Chinese publications that directly acknowledge the value of the contested area, 
there are several statements that stress the importance of natural resources for the development of 
China. Again, this seems obvious, but many of these statements include the significance of maritime 
rights in the South China Sea to provide these resources to the Chinese people.  
For instance, the white paper on China’s peaceful development road (2005: III) states that ‘the main 
problem facing China in its development is […] the contradiction between economic and social 
development and the relatively strong pressure of the population, natural resources and the 
environment’. The need to protect these natural resources is stressed in the section ‘Land and 
Seaborder Defense’: ‘[China] defends and administers its land borders and seas under its jurisdiction, 
safeguards the country's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and secures both its 
land and sea borders strictly in accordance with treaties and agreements it has signed with 
neighbouring countries, and the UNCLOS’ (SC PRC 2002: IV). The latest white paper concerning 
China’s peaceful development calls on regional parties to set aside differences and seek common 
ground in safeguarding regional peace and stability, including the settling of disputes over territorial 
claims and maritime rights, to increase trade and economic development (2011: III). This may be a 
reference to the conflict between China and the Philippines and a link to setting aside disputes and 
increasing economic development. This should confirm the value of the contested areas to China’s 
continuing economic rise. 
Conclusion 
The implications of China’s economic rise are indeed far-reaching and also influence the behaviour of 
China. The findings of this analysis illustrate the link between China’s development and the 
increasing value of the contested areas submitted to the PCA tribunal. The official documents do not 
explicitly discuss the noncompliant behaviour of China, which might be explained by China’s reticent 
attitude in its official statements and publications. The combination of the general overview and the 
in-depth analysis shows the linkage between China’s economic rise and its changing behaviour during 
conflict, but the results fail to provide an airtight causal process for the change in China’s compliance 
behaviour.  
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4.2 Causal factor 2  
The influence of China’s core interests and principles on its (foreign) policy 
China’s ‘core principles’ should be interpreted as norms and values that are of great importance to 
China’s method of achieving their ‘core interests.’ Although this definition is not completely clear-
cut, it is obvious that these interests and principles depend on and interact with each other (Huang 
2014; Shih & Yin 2013). In addition, since 1954 the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence5 have 
had a prominent place in China’s foreign policy and are still referred to in official state documents. 
The influence of these core principles and interests on China’s behaviour is analysed in the official 
documents that are outlined in Table 2. 
Table 2: Analysed Documents: causal factor 2 
No.  Date Document Title  Source  
1.  1998 White Paper China’s National Defense CPG PRC 
2.  1998 White Paper The Development of China’s Marine Environment CPG PRC 
3.  2000 White Paper China’s National Defense in 2000 CPG PRC 
4.  
2000 Initiation China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence 
FMPRC 
5.  
2001 Conference 
Remarks  
Conference on the diplomatic work with 
neighbouring countries 
 
6.  2002 White paper  China’s National Defense in 2002 CPG PRC 
7.  2004 White paper  China’s National Defense in 2004 CPG PRC 
8.  2005 Statement  President Hu at the UN Summit   
9.  2005 White paper China’s Peaceful Development Road CPG PRC 
10.  2006 White paper  China’s National Defense in 2006 CPG PRC 
11.  2008 White Paper China’s National Defense in 2008 SC PRC 
12.  2010 White Paper  China’s National Defense in 2010 SC PRC 
13.  2011 White paper China’s Peaceful Development  CPG PRC 
14.  
2013 Conference 
Remarks  
Conference on the diplomatic work with 
neighbouring countries 
 
15.  2013 White Paper Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces CPG PRC 
16.  2015 White Paper China’s Military Strategy SC PRC 
 
																																								 																				
5 The principles of (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) 
mutual non-interference, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence, originate from the 
negotiations in 1953-54 between China and India concerning the “Tibet Region of China and India” (CMFA 
2000). 
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The Chinese government published official documents from 1998 until 2010 concerning its national 
defence, which are publicly available (Zhang 2012). These white papers are used in the analysis of 
China’s core principles and interests regarding its foreign policy. The sections that include references 
to China’s interests and principles, specifically on foreign policy, are analysed. The general overview 
shows that there is an evident decrease in the attention to the International Security Cooperation 
section. This section contains the principles and interests on which China based its foreign (defence) 
policy. Where the white paper published in 2000, devotes almost 3000 characters to international 
security cooperation, the 2010 white paper does not even include an individual section on this topic 
(Figure 5). Considering the different lengths of the analysed white papers, the coverage percentage of 
International Security Cooperation decreases significantly over the years (Figure 2). These 
observations demonstrate that the Chinese government devotes less attention to the so-called 
international security cooperation. Although it is not explicitly stated, the fact that International 
Security Cooperation receives less attention in the national defence white papers over the years might 
suggest that this subject has become less important in China’s defence policy.  
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Figure 6: Coverage of International Security Cooperation in the National Defense White Papers 
 
	
Chinese National Defense White Papers (1998 – 2010) 
The first white paper in 1998 states the focus of China’s defence policy is cooperation. In this white 
paper, the word ‘cooperation’ is mentioned 48 times and the importance of regional and international 
security cooperation is emphasized: China unswervingly pursues a national defence policy that is 
defensive in nature, […] strengthens international and regional security cooperation and actively 
participates in the international arms control and disarmament process. [...] Facts show that China is 
a responsible big country and a firm force safeguarding world peace and stability (CPG PRC 1998: 
II). The combination of a defensive national defence policy and pursuance of cooperation and joint 
development is in line with the principles advocated by Dao Xiaoping (Huang 2014). Furthermore, 
China insists on ‘dealing with its foreign military relations independently and engaging in military 
exchanges and cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (CPG PRC 1998: 
IV). These principles recur in every National Defense white paper and are described in China’s 
Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FMPRC 2000).  
Whereas the 2000 white paper builds on the familiar concepts and interests (CPG PRC 2000: II), the 
2002 white paper shows an important development. It explicitly states for the first time that China’s 
national interests are ‘the fundamental basis for the formulation of China’s national defense policy’ 
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(CPG PRC 2002: I). Prior to this, other factors such as China’s political system, its cultural and 
historical traditions were thought to be influential on China’s policy (Zhang 2013). This white paper 
further defines the key national interests of China: ‘(1) safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, 
territorial integrity and security; (2) upholding economic development as the central task and 
enhancing overall national strength; (3) adhering to and improving the socialist system; (4) 
maintaining social stability and harmony; and (5) striving for an international environment of lasting 
peace and a favourable climate in China’s periphery’ (Zhang 2013: 893). After the definition of 
China’s core interests in 2002, the 2004 white paper emphasized the ‘intensified bilateral and 
multilateral strategic consultation and dialogues with countries concerned in security and defense 
fields which contribute to better mutual trust and mutual exchange and cooperation’ (CPG PRC 
2004: IX). This reflects the change in leadership of the Chinese Government.  
The key message of the 2006 white paper on national defence was concerned with China’s peaceful 
development. It recognized the critical period of international multi-polarization and adapts its policy, 
specifically striving for a harmonious international environment: ‘Committed to peace, development 
and cooperation, China pursues a road of peaceful development, and endeavours to build, together 
with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. […] Never 
before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today’ (CPG PRC 2006: 
preface). It points out that ‘hegemonies and power politics remain key factors undermining 
international security China’ (CPG PRC 2006: X) and distances itself from competing in arms races 
or posing military threats. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence also remain important: In the 
2008 white paper, these principles are mentioned in regard to the development of friendly relations. 
This paper pays less attention to international cooperation and focuses more on the growing 
importance of China’s national defence strategy and military planning. The white paper published a 
strategic blueprint for the national military development and for the first time devotes individual 
chapters to military	organizations (CPG PRC 2008).  
The 2010 white paper was published amidst heightened concerns of China pursuing expansionist 
goals in both economic and military areas (Zhang 2013: 895). Therefore, a part of the white paper was 
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particularly devoted to the non-warfare activities of the People’s liberation Army (PLA) and was 
committed to building mutual trust between the PLA and foreign counterparts (CPG PRC 2010: IX). 
Remarkably, the section of International Security Cooperation was absent for the first time in the 
national defence white paper. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are still mentioned in the 
chapter on national defence policy, and it is explicitly stated that ‘China will never seek hegemony, 
nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy 
develops’ (CPG PRC 2010: II). Nevertheless, pursuance of international cooperation as one of its core 
principles seems to have lost importance in China’s national defence white papers.  
Other documents  
The 2010 National Defense White Paper was the final officially published document on China’s 
general national defence policy. In 2013 and 2015 two additional white papers were published on 
specific military topics. These official publications sketch a new international security situation and 
present an inward-looking focus with targets such as ‘safeguarding national sovereignty, security and 
territorial integrity, and supporting the country's peaceful development’ (SC PRC 2013: I). The 2013 
white paper also mentions the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in ‘deepening security 
cooperation and fulfilling international obligations’ (SC PRC 2013: I).  
Comparing these documents, the use of the word ‘obligations’ creates a different attitude towards 
international society from the previously used words ‘development’ and ‘participation.’6 This leads to 
the conclusion that the Chinese government expresses itself differently towards its interest of joint 
development. The international security cooperation is no longer approached as a goal that can be 
reached by strengthening international relations, but as an obligation that needs to be fulfilled. The 
conversion of China’s principles and interests can also be established in the comparison of the 
President’s remarks at the Conference on the diplomatic work with neighbouring countries in 2005 
and 2013. This comparison provides indications for both continuity and change in China’s core 
principles and interests. However, the interest in cooperation shifts from international to regional and 
																																								 																				
6 Used in the white papers between 1998 and 2008 regarding the subject of international security cooperation. 
  26 
domestic cooperation. Overall, the variance in the official documents considering China’s core 
principles and interests is evidently present.   
Conclusion 
The comparison of the national defence white papers shows both continuity and change. The core 
principles remain intact, as seen by the continuous recurrence of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. The findings of the analysis of certain paragraphs in the official documents show the 
changing behaviour of China towards international security cooperation. The white papers pay less 
attention to this subject. Concluding, China’s attitude towards international cooperation (and towards 
international society) seems to change according to the content analyses of the official documents. 
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4.3 Causal factor 3 
External threats and pressures 
The influence of external threats and international pressures on China’s behaviour in conflict has been 
analysed in previous studies (Fravel 2008; Fravel 2010). In addition to neoclassical realist research, 
the analysis of this causal factor includes China’s reaction to strategic choices of its rivals and allies. 
External threats arise from actions taken by other states, such as the unilateral submission of the 
overlapping territorial claims at the PCA by the Philippine government (Feng 2016). Another example 
of an external threat is the enhanced cooperation between the United States and the Philippines by 
reinforcement of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)7 (Kim 2016: 45). These 
actions occur outside the direct sphere of influence of China but they do shape its position in 
international society. The same applies to the international pressures that affect China: the 
international pressure of states, the United Nations, and the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN)8 to ratify the UNCLOS. Although it was never explicitly stated, signing and ratifying the 
UNCLOS was an unavoidable act caused by international pressure (Lee 1999: 39).   
In the final part of this study, external threats and international pressures that the Chinese government 
experienced during the conflict between the Philippines and China are analysed. The focus of these 
analyses is positioned with the Chinese perception of the choices and actions of rivals. Therefore, 
official statements and documents of Chinese governmental bodies are studied. These are listed in the 
Table 4.  
During the period of measurement, China was involved in several disputes, some of them concerning 
maritime conflicts in the South China Sea (Lee 1999; Mearsheimer 2014). The analysed documents 
are directly or indirectly connected to the specific dispute with the Philippines and cover either the 
actions of the two main actors or on other involved parties, such as Vietnam or the United States 
(Feng 2016; Kim 2016; Hossain 2017). These documents include official reactions of the Chinese 
																																								 																				
7 The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement is constituted in 2014, as a follow-up of the Visiting Forces 
Agreement (1999) and is signed by the Philippines and the US. It is a military agreement that allows forces from 
both states to work closely together. This includes easier access for US forces to Philippine bases and facilities 
(Armando 2014; Kim 2016). 
8 Regional intergovernmental organization that is established in 1967 to strengthen economic and political 
cooperation. It also plays an important part in this conflict, but this is not taken into further account in this study. 
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government or other related bodies on the choices of actors involved. The temporal element of this 
study determines whether there is any change in China’s position towards its allies and rivals and its 
behaviour in international society. 
Table 3: Analysed Documents: causal factor 3 
No.  Date Document type Title  Source  
1.  2004 White Paper China’s National Defense in 2004 CPG PRC 
2.  2008 White Paper China’s National Defense in 2008 CPG PRC 
3.  2010 White Paper China’s National Defense in 2010 SC PRC 
4.  2012 News China-US Relations in China’s overall diplomacy 
in the new Era 
FMPRC 
5.  2013 Press Release Press Release of Chinese Ambassador Ma 
Keqing of the Philippines  
Storey 2014 
6.  2013 FMPRC 
Statement 
Regarding the unilateral submission of the 
Philippine Government 
Storey 2014 
7.  2014 Position Paper On the matter of jurisdiction of the South China 
Sea Arbitration initiated by the Republic of the 
Philippines 
FMPRC 
8.  2016 FMPRC 
Statement 
Settling disputes between China and the 
Philippines in the South China Sea through 
bilateral negotiations  
FMPRC 
9.  2016 FMPRC 
Statement 
Regarding the Award of 12 July 2016 of the 
Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea 
Arbitration established at the request of the 
Republic of the Philippine Government 
FMPRC 
10.  2016 Government 
Statement 
China’s territorial sovereignty and their maritime 
interests in the South China Sea 
FMPRC 
 
When analysing the national defence white papers, the position of China towards certain international 
actors became apparent in various sections. For instance, the ‘Taiwan Straits’ situation was mentioned 
in every white paper, in which China’s position continually became more assertive (CPG PRC 1998 - 
2002; SC PRC 2004 - 2010).  More relevant to this study is the position towards the actors that are 
involved in the South China Sea conflict. In the 2004 white paper, the position of the US towards the 
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Taiwan Straits situation is positively mentioned: ‘The United States has on many occasions reaffirmed 
adherence to the one China policy, observance of the three joint communiqués and opposition to 
"Taiwan independence."’ (CPG PRC 2004: I). China’s perception of the United States changes in the 
following white papers, as does the manner of defining its relationship with the US in these white 
papers. In this general overview, the number of references to the relevant international actors is 
measured in both positive as negative quality. This analysis is conducted on both the official white 
papers as the official statements and documents published in the matter of the South China Sea 
dispute with the Philippines. The changes in China’s approach towards external influences are more 
specifically analysed in the in-depth analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of concepts in National Defense White Papers 
	
As is shown, the results of the general overview are not conclusive. The main reason for this 
inconclusiveness lies with the impossibility of defining concepts that are used to describe the 
relationship between China and its opposition. Furthermore, these white papers elaborate on China’s 
national defence and are not created for the purpose of stating China’s opinion regarding international 
actors. However, it is interesting to see an increase in references to the concepts that are related to 
China’s external threats during the course of this conflict, and especially after the initiation of the 
PCA arbitration.  
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Figure 8: Remarks of FMPRC Spokespersons 
The second analysis covers the statements of official spokespersons’ reactions of the actions of 
relevant parties during the tribunal. It measures the use of concepts that are related to China’s 
sovereignty in the South China Sea, and any opposition or threat an actor poses to China’s so-called 
rights in this maritime area. The documents are retrieved from the publicly available database that 
include spokespersons remarks on the South China Sea matter. Relative to each other, the results 
provide no structural change in China’s perception towards its opposition. However, the analysed 
remarks cover a short period of time, from 2014 until 2016. All of these remarks are published in 
reaction to the Philippine initiation of the PCA arbitration and the effects of China’s denial of the 
arbitration. Taking this into consideration, it can be determined that the results deviate from the tenor 
of China’s official publications before the initiation of the PCA.  
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Table 4: Analysed Documents: Remarks by Chinese Spokespersons 
No.  Date  Title 
1. 30/03/14 “Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (FMS) Hong Lei on the Philippines' 
Submission of a Memorial to the Arbitral Tribunal in Relation to Disputes with 
China in the South China Sea” 
2. 15/07/2014 “FMS Hong Lei's Remarks on the South China Sea-related Comments Made by 
the US Official” 
3. 12/12/2014 “FMS Hong Lei's Remarks on Vietnam's Statement on the Chinese Government's 
Position Paper on Rejecting the Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal Established at 
the Request of the Philippines for the South China Sea Arbitration” 
4. 24/07/2015 “FMS Lu Kang's Remarks on the US Statement about Issues Relating to the 
Arbitration Unilaterally Initiated by the Philippines” 
5. 13/07/2016 “FMS Lu Kang's Remarks on Statement by Spokesperson of US State Department 
on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling” 
 
In the analysed documents, the Chinese spokespersons stress the importance of China’s territorial 
sovereignty and rights. On average, indisputable sovereignty is mentioned 2.8 times and 2 of these 
mentions include China’s maritime rights in the South China Sea. This shows a remarkable change 
with respect to the South China Sea dialogues between the Philippines and China in the period of 
bilateral negotiations between 1994 – 1997. During those negotiations, both parties did not publicly 
claim or contest sovereignty of the Spratly Islands (Lee 1999: 38). Another notable observation is the 
direct critiques the spokespersons pose to the opposing parties. In its first reaction to the initiation, 
China urges the Philippines to ‘comprehensively and effectively implement the consensus […] and 
return to the right track of settling the disputes through bilateral negotiations’ (Lei 2014). But after 
the PCA arbitration, China argued that the Philippine government violated international law and 
accuses the state of ‘a political farce under the cloak of law’ (Kang 2016). The involvement of the 
United States in the South China Sea dispute is denoted as ‘irresponsible’ and the US is urged to 
‘think over its words and deeds, stop advertising the illegal arbitration and meddling with the South 
China Sea Issue, and cease undermining China’s sovereignty and security interests and escalating 
regional tensions’ (Kang 2016). According to the Chinese government, the actions of other states 
obstruct efforts to peacefully resolve the South China Sea disputes. 
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Conclusion 
This analysis shows China’s increasingly assertive tone towards its international opposition. The 
change in China’s perception of these threats is in line with the change in China’s behaviour during 
the conflict. China adheres to its original decision to oppose and refuse any ruling of tribunal, and 
does not acknowledge the jurisdictional power of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the matter. 
This point of view goes against the tribunal’s verdict, which recognizes the arbitration as legally valid 
(PCA 2016). China’s perception of other states and their actions therefore have explanatory value for 
China’s change in compliance behaviour with the UNCLOS. 
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5. Conclusion 
The initiation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the Philippines in 2013 added a new element 
to the South China Sea conflict with China. It also created a unique situation regarding China’s 
behaviour in conflict, which the existing theoretical approaches could not explain. The explicit 
noncompliant behaviour that was shown with China’s rejection of the PCA arbitration is not in line 
with the core principles and interest of China’s policy (Huang 2014), but neither could be explained 
by a purely systemic approach such as classical realism (Mearsheimer 2006). Therefore, the goal of 
this study was to provide a more concluding answer to the changes in China’s compliance behaviour 
by including the influence of external threats.  
The research was conducted with the help of a neoclassical realist approach. According to this 
theoretical framework, causal factors of both the systemic and domestic level of analysis should be 
included to explain states’ behaviour. The research studied China’s changing behaviour alongside the 
analyses of three key causal factors, and during the analyses, it became clear that all three key factors 
showed variance and a certain influence on China’s foreign policy. For instance, some of the core 
principles and interests are currently losing their significance. The inclusion of the principles of 
cooperation reduces gradually in the white papers and the importance of these principles decreases, 
according to the results. The connection between China’s economic rise and its changing behaviour in 
conflict is less evident, but in the analysis a link is found between settling maritime territorial disputes 
and increasing economic development. Final, the influence of external threats is shown in China’s 
increasing assertive tone towards its international opposition. Whereas China did not publicly claim 
sovereignty in the Spratly Islands during the negotiations with the Philippines in 1994 – 1997, the 
current spokespersons of the Chinese government stress China’s indisputable sovereignty repeatedly.  
The overall conclusion of these analyses is that the change in China’s compliance behaviour cannot be 
unilaterally explained. All three factors exercise a certain influence on China’s policy. This study 
provided an empirical foundation for the mutual linkage between the three causal factors and relative 
to China’s behaviour in the South China Sea dispute. The influence of external threats is important for 
future policy making of international actors that effect the relation between China and these actors. 
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Further study of the influences of external threats and pressures on China’s compliance behaviour 
may provide certain guidelines that can be implemented to future policies that can improve the 
relationship between China and the international society.   
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